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that have occurred in Southeast Asia 
or off Nigeria) in terms of state failure, 
and counterpiracy as the maximization 
by states of their competitive advantage 
over other states in an international 
system where material capabilities are 
changing� For its part, neoliberalism ar-
gues that states seek to create norms and 
shape them through international insti-
tutions� These facilitate cooperation and 
enable states to act through them under 
international law, albeit for self-interested 
reasons� Exponents of this theory see 
United Nations action and UN Security 
Council resolutions as reflecting the 
aims and objectives of their sponsoring 
powers� It also explains why so many de-
velopmental initiatives have foundered 
within Somalia—because they seek to 
aid the creation of a Western-style liberal 
democracy rather than political arrange-
ments that may align more closely with 
Somali political and clan structures�
However, the book under review also 
collects a number of essays articulating 
a third approach, called constructivism� 
That theory departs from state-centric, 
rationalist approaches to suggest that 
social processes, including norms 
other than international ones, as well 
as issues of identity, inform security 
interests across a range of players and 
shape their actions accordingly� 
This collection focuses particularly 
on the topic of global governance, a 
construct that places particular empha-
sis on institutions and regimes (in this 
case security regimes) and implies that 
international institutions are actors in 
their own right� In this view, these actors 
have objectives that are often different 
from those of their member states and 
that in turn shape the behavior of those 
states and of nonstate actors� Interest-
ingly, and rightly, it takes the view that 
because piracy occurs in a space outside 
territorially bounded state authority, 
maritime depredation asks profound 
questions about who exactly decides 
what is right and wrong, and why�
Several contributors make the point 
that differences between state re-
sponses to piracy reveal governance 
gaps in the interstate system, gaps that 
pirates have exploited—and states too, 
a point emphasizing the indissoluble 
connection between piracy and state 
action� The role of international law 
comes under particular scrutiny� Legal 
discourse has played a crucial role 
in framing the piracy problem in the 
modern era, arguably at the expense of 
political and economic approaches� 
In the end, this important and useful 
book asks everyone with an interest 
or a role in piracy issues to confront 
questions that affect all users of the 
sea, military and civilian� Are we 
witnessing the end of an old regime, 
the reactivation of old legal mecha-
nisms, or the development of a global 
governance regime based on interna-
tional institutions? Moreover, where 
will this process end and will notions 
of universal jurisdiction, and perhaps 
global citizenship, spread out from their 
current enclaves and touch us all?
MARTIN MURPHY 
Alexandria, Virginia
Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia: War, De-
ceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern 
Middle East� New York: Doubleday, 2013� 592pp� 
$28�95
As the subtitle suggests, the First World 
War, with its unintended consequences, 
unbridled imperial ambitions, and a 
1
Seal and Anderson: Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making o
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
 1 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
complicated maze of duplicitous deal-
ings among untrusting allies, underlies 
the making of the modern Middle East� 
One could easily add martial lunacy 
to this list of horribles, as this brief but 
highly relevant treatment of Britain’s 
mismanagement of the Gallipoli, Meso-
potamia, and Gaza campaigns will attest� 
None of this is news, but the topic has 
garnered a great deal of attention in 
recent years� Anderson covers the famil-
iar ground well, outlining the political, 
diplomatic, military, and economic 
drivers of imperial ambitions as the 
Western allies plotted the dismantling of 
the Ottoman Empire� In telling this tale 
Anderson discusses the usual suspects: 
Mark Sykes, Henry McMahon, King  
Husayn, Faisal ibn Husayn, Lord Kitch-
ener, and a host of others� More interest-
ingly, however, he ties in as well a num-
ber of important players who generally 
get short shrift� The German diplomats 
Max von Oppenheim and Curt Prufer 
are major players in the story� So too is 
Djemel Pasha, the Turkish governor of 
Syria� The role of the American William 
Yale, first as an officer of Standard Oil 
Company of New York and later as a 
special agent for the State Department, 
is also significant, if only for beginning a 
ninety-five-year tradition of fundamen-
tally misreading the region� Finally, the 
importance of Aaron Aaronsohn and his 
Zionist spy ring that supported British 
operations in Palestine receives its due� 
Anderson’s T� E� Lawrence is a compli-
cated and enigmatic man who “seemed 
intent on baffling” historians� Not-
ing his many admirable and not-so-
admirable qualities, Anderson neither 
praises nor condemns but rather tries 
to understand this hugely talented but 
ultimately unsuccessful man� Rely-
ing heavily but not uncritically on 
Lawrence’s writings, Anderson attributes 
his tactical, operational, and essentially 
political-military successes to brilliance, 
timing, and sheer luck—the latter largely 
owing to his managing to avoid the 
consequences of having infuriated any 
number of very senior officers� Ander-
son portrays well the tension caused 
for Lawrence by the duplicity of British 
and French diplomacy vis-à-vis the 
Arab uprising between his loyalty to 
Britain and his sense of personal honor�
Among the cast of dishonest brokers 
Anderson paints as the worst Mark 
Sykes, a brilliant but unprincipled dilet-
tante with no apparent compunction 
against lying to his own government or 
to Britain’s allies� Working diligently to 
advance Britain’s imperial interests by 
managing the flow of (and often invent-
ing) information, Sykes accumulated 
a great deal of responsibility for the 
postwar mess that was and remains the 
Middle East� Others contributing to the 
mess are a whole bevy of senior British 
and French officials, and also Woodrow 
Wilson, whose profound ignorance, 
idealism, and arrogance opened a 
Pandora’s box of ethnic and nationalist 
desires that still smolder throughout the 
region� As for the Arabs, often portrayed 
as victims, they seem here not to have 
been as gullible as it may appear� Citing 
Husayn’s and Faisal’s not-always-
aboveboard diplomacy, aided by Law-
rence’s unauthorized revelation of the 
secret Sykes-Picot agreement, Anderson 
argues that the Arabs were not exactly 
“rubes” when it came to power politics� 
A journalist by trade, Scott Anderson 
is a frequent contributor to a variety of 
periodicals and the author of two novels 
and several books of nonfiction� His bib-
liography is extensive, but the paucity in 
it of Arab and Turkish sources is notable� 
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In addition, his use of nonstandard nota-
tions can render specific citations a little 
fuzzy� This is a minor issue, however, 
as Anderson’s synthesis is superb, his 
analysis is sharp, and his writing style is 
engaging� All in all, this is a very useful 
contribution to the body of work, one 
that helps foster a better understanding 
of the dynamics shaping today’s Arab 
Spring and beyond� Given America’s 
track record in the region, anything that 
helps broaden our understanding of the 
Middle East can only be a good thing�
THOMAS E� SEAL, COLONEL, U�S� MARINE CORPS, 
RETIRED
Stafford, Virginia
 
Boscawen, Hugh� The Capture of Louisbourg, 
1758. Campaigns and Commanders� Norman: 
Univ� of Oklahoma Press, 2011� 504pp� $39�95 
The British amphibious operation to 
capture the French fortress at Louis-
bourg in Canada during the Seven Years’ 
War was the largest joint operation un-
dertaken by British forces in that period� 
This major event in naval history has 
not been overlooked by historians, but 
no one until Colonel Hugh Boscawen, 
British Army (Ret�), has been able so 
effectively to combine the skills of an ex-
perienced army officer with those of an 
insightful modern historian in analyzing 
this campaign and its commanders� 
A direct descendant of the British naval 
commander at the capture of Louis-
bourg, Admiral the Honorable Edward 
Boscawen, Colonel Hugh Boscawen 
brings his own experience of thirty years 
of active military service in the Cold-
stream Guards to bear on the subject, 
with his knowledge of modern-day 
campaign planning and execution� Such 
credentials might have led an author 
in the wrong direction, resulting in an 
anachronistic and hagiographic tale full 
of modern military jargon� However, in 
Hugh Boscawen’s hands they have led 
to a model of careful historical scholar-
ship informed by professional military 
understanding, experience at sea as a 
yachtsman, and access to family papers� 
Starting out from the key conceptual 
point that campaigns and command-
ers should be seen in the context of the 
aims, ways, and means of their own day, 
Boscawen has carefully and judiciously 
examined the subject� Over many years, 
he made a thorough study of both the 
published English- and the published 
French-language scholarship� Going 
much farther and deeper, he examined 
in detail the extensive public and private 
records in four French and eight British 
archival depositories, as well as other 
primary-source materials in Canada, 
the United States, and private hands� 
Colonel Boscawen opens his study with 
an overview of the strategic situation 
that the competing powers of Britain 
and France faced in the period imme-
diately leading up to 1758, and of the 
contrasting organization of those gov-
ernments and their leaders� Boscawen 
goes on to examine the background to 
the construction of the French fortifica-
tion at Louisbourg, ranging from the 
reorganization of the defense of New 
France following the Peace of Utrecht 
in 1713 to the perception on both 
sides that Louisbourg had become an 
important trading point, the key bastion 
in the defense of the Saint Lawrence 
River and Quebec, as well as the French 
fisheries on the Grand Banks� When 
war broke out again between the two 
countries in 1755, neither was imme-
diately prepared to react decisively� 
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